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## REMARKS

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85-04153

February 7, 1985

Mr. Harry E. Fitzwater  
Deputy Director for Administration  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Fitzwater:

The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has completed its FY 1984 series of inspections in accordance with the procedures outlined in my March 7, 1984 letter to your office and in compliance with the provisions of Sections 5.2(b)(2) and (4) of Executive Order 12356 and ISOO implementing Directive No. 1. The inspection encompassed a review of classified documents to determine if they were properly classified and marked; safeguarding procedures; training programs; and interviews with officials from various branches and offices of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Because of time constraints and the number of offices visited, the inspection in each office was not comprehensive and did not encompass all the above subjects.

The results of the ISOO inspections are contained in the enclosed report. You will note that the CIA continues to comply with the provisions of the Order. The report does include a few recommendations which we believe will further enhance your agency's information security program. I recognize that the problems identified are the result of differing classification marking procedures used by the agencies in the Intelligence Community. Any coordination on your part that can standardize the markings on the different documents can enhance the program. I appreciate the outstanding support [redacted] provided Mr. STAT Mason during the course of his inspections and the cooperation of officials interviewed by Mr. Mason.

Sincerely,



STEVEN GARFINKEL  
Director

Enclosure

**Report of Inspection by  
The Information Security Oversight Office  
of the  
Central Intelligence Agency**

**I. General**

On March 15, May 3 and August 28, 1984, Harold Mason, Program Analyst, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), inspected the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) information security program to evaluate its compliance with Executive Order 12356. Mr. Mason was accompanied by CIA liaison [redacted] Chief, Information Management Branch. ISOO's FY 1984 inspections continued to concentrate on agency training programs; marking and safeguarding; and in particular, focused on the degree of understanding CIA personnel had of relevant provisions of E.O. 12356 as they relate to original and derivative classification.

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**II. Findings**

**A. Classification/Marking**

The agency continues to use its classification guide as a basis for its derivative classification. CIA procedures for using the guide as a basis for a derivative classification are more effective than procedures in most other agencies because CIA officials marking the documents are required to identify the specific item in the guide. This procedure facilitates the conduct of audit trails to determine if the level and duration assignments are proper.

The ISOO analyst did encounter marking problems in some offices within the Community Headquarters. In some instances documents were derivatively classified on the basis of multiple sources, but the derivative classifiers failed to maintain the identification of each source with the file or record copy of the derivatively classified document. In another instance, Community Headquarters received a classified document from another agency that was portion marked. The office in Community Headquarters generated another document from the source document but failed to carry forward the portion marking. The last type of marking problem encountered involved multiple page documents or reports with inserts and attachments. Contributors to the final product are often military and non-military agencies. The military portion mark their input in the beginning of the paragraph and the agency contributions were marked at the end of the paragraph. The Order does permit either method but there should be

consistency within a single report especially since it will generally get wide dissemination and possibly be used as the basis for derivative classification. I recognize that the make up of the Community Headquarters contributes to this type of problem, but careful editing of the final product can resolve the discrepancy. Not all offices had marking problems. Many documents reviewed were portion marked by paragraph, subparagraph, and even specific pieces of information. The marking officials stated that it was extremely important that documents be marked thoroughly because of the sensitivity of the final product.

Some officials inside and outside of the agency feel that one directorate uses the special marking "ORCON" in its reports too frequently. It is their contention that the frequent use of the caveat impedes them from producing a final product or report expeditiously because they must obtain approval to use the information, which in turn, results in undesired delays.

#### **B. Training**

Personnel responsible for the classifying and marking of documents continue to receive effective initial and refresher training. Immediate corrections are made when errors in marking procedures are detected. Training in the handling, safeguarding and use of classified information is an ongoing program with frequent refresher sessions and constant observation.

#### **C. Safeguarding**

The agency has excellent procedures for the transmittal, storage and handling of classified information. Programs and procedures are constantly reviewed to determine if they require upgrading or modification. Individual offices have strict programs for the checking and control of classified information in their possession. No deficiency was detected during the course of the inspections.

### **III. Conclusion**

The Central Intelligence Agency's information security program is in compliance with the Executive Order and the ISOO Directive. The only problems detected were instances of mis-marked documents at Community Headquarters.

#### **IV. Recommendations**

Documents should be periodically checked at Community Headquarters to determine if they are in compliance with the Order. When deficiencies are detected, the responsible official should be notified and errors corrected.